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Trends in Communist Media

12 Nov 75

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

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~~Confidential~~

12 NOVEMBER 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 45)

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FBIS TRENDS

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U. S. CABINET CHANGES

PEKING REPLAYS COMMENT CRITICAL OF SCHLESINGER DISMISSAL

Peking has responded to the recent Ford Administration changes with a widely publicized 7 November NCNA dispatch reporting critical U.S. and foreign comment on the dismissal of Secretary Schlesinger. NCNA carefully refrained from comment in its own name, but the dispatch departed from Peking's past circumspect treatment of the U.S. Administration by replaying comments which focused on the firing of Schlesinger as a clear sign of the Ford Administration's determination to speed up detente with the Soviet Union and which also criticized the decision as detrimental to U.S. national security.

SCHLESINGER DISMISSAL The NCNA dispatch focused on the Schlesinger firing as an indication of the determination of the President and Kissinger to "ease tensions" with Moscow; significantly, it did not follow the heretofore standard Chinese media practice of also noting the U.S. leaders' countervailing determination to resolutely maintain U.S. security interests against alleged Soviet encroachment.* NCNA replayed British press comment calling Kissinger the "arch-architect" of detente with Moscow. And again citing the British press, NCNA quoted the observation that President Ford's decision to release Schlesinger while retaining Kissinger "shows clearly which side he takes in the argument about 'detente.'"

NCNA reported comments by Senator Jackson and others praising Schlesinger and criticizing his dismissal as "a loss to the nation . . . in the pursuit of a prudent defense and foreign policy." It cited statements that the firing had upset West European leaders and could serve to weaken NATO strength against the Warsaw Pact. The dispatch replayed Soviet and U.S. comment highlighting Moscow's pleasure over Schlesinger's departure and speculating that "the shuffle in Washington will certainly be regarded by the Kremlin as a step in the right direction." It concluded by citing Washington POST reports that the Schlesinger dismissal would broaden the "already widening debate in the United States over the pros and cons of detente with the Soviet Union."

* For example, while NCNA on 1 August 1975 noted that President Ford and Brezhnev "were all polite, shaking hands with each other and talking amiably" during the European Security Conference summit in Helsinki, the same report also stressed that the President was using that summit meeting in order to consult with NATO leaders on how best to strengthen Western defense against the USSR. See the TRENDS of 6 August 1975, pages 6-7.

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In reporting President Ford's 3 November remarks on the appointment of U.S. Liaison Office Chief George Bush to the CIA, NCNA included the President's remark that he "had not had an opportunity to focus in on the replacement for Mr. Bush."

BACKGROUND In recent years Peking has rarely reported U.S. Cabinet changes, and it has invariably avoided replaying comment critical of such shifts. For instance, Peking is not known to have reported Schlesinger's 2 July 1973 appointment as defense secretary. The Chinese did note Secretary Kissinger's takeover in the State Department and William Rogers' departure in a terse, four-sentence September 1973 NCNA report. The resignation of former President Nixon and inauguration of President Ford was also handled circumspectly, with a brief 9 August 1974 NCNA dispatch.

During Schlesinger's tenure as defense secretary, Peking extensively replayed his statements advocating a strong and vigilant U.S. defense posture as the foundation of an effective security policy for the West. Similar Chinese media coverage greeted public statements by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger on U.S. strategic vigilance against Moscow, but Schlesinger's more frequent statements on the subject consequently resulted in more frequent Chinese citations of his remarks than those of President Ford and Kissinger. At no time did such dispatches suggest that Schlesinger was at odds with President Ford and Kissinger.

COMMENT ON MUNICH PACT On the same day that NCNA reported the Ford Administration changes it carried two "international reference material" articles explaining respectively the significance of the 1938 Munich agreement and the 1940 Dunkirk evacuation to the Chinese domestic audience. The articles were also published in PEOPLE'S DAILY and broadcast by Peking radio. The articles focused on the disastrous results of the Munich "policy of appeasement" followed by the British and French leaders in "conniving with the aggressive acts" of the fascists in order "to divert" the "spearhead of aggression toward the east." One report concluded by noting that "since then, people have often described similar schemes by several major powers in conniving at aggression and betraying other countries as a 'Munich' or a 'Munich plot.'" Recent NCNA replays of foreign comment have highlighted those labeling as a new "Munich" the East-West agreement signed at the Helsinki European Security Conference this summer, as well as characterizations of Brezhnev playing the Hitler role at that conference.*

* Peking has avoided such charges in its own name. Chinese reaction to the conference is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 August 1975, pages 6-7.

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MOSCOW SHOWS RETICENCE TO DISCUSS ADMINISTRATION SHAKEUP

Analysis in Soviet media of recent Ford Administration cabinet changes has not gone beyond the initial reports, which seemed to underscore the continuity in U.S. policy and the continuing "dominant" role of Secretary Kissinger.* Those dispatches had cited press reports that disagreement between Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger was a factor in the changes. The 10 November TASS report of the President's "Meet the Press" television appearance made the latter point official by quoting Ford as saying that "the dismissal of James Schlesinger as defense secretary was due, in large measure, to differences between him and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, which created certain problems," but PRAVDA's abbreviated published report omitted that observation.

On 11 November, RED STAR and IZVESTIYA published a 9 November TASS report of the President's speech in Boston on the 7th that seemed critical of his choice of Donald Rumsfeld to replace Schlesinger. In contrast to a 5 November RED STAR biography which had placed Rumsfeld in the "moderate wing" of the Republican Party, the 9 November dispatch said his "dedication to the policy of a strong defense was well demonstrated in Congress and as U.S. representative to NATO." The dispatch further observed that President Ford had "paid tribute to supporters of international tension" by his assertion that force was the only reliable foundation of peace--a linkage also stressed by Defense Minister Grechko and other military leaders on occasion. PRAVDA's report on the President's Boston speech deleted both of these comments by TASS.

Moscow will probably look closely at the implications of Secretary Kissinger's loss of the chairmanship of the National Security Council. Last summer one USA Institute analyst saw the appointment of Kissinger to both State Department and NSC posts as a sign that detente was being "institutionalized" in the United States. S.B. Chetverikov, writing in USA in August 1974, said that one of the motives of the White House in retaining Kissinger in his National Security Council role while appointing him Secretary of State was to aid in curbing the Pentagon's influence in the formation of foreign policy.**

* Initial Soviet reaction to the cabinet changes is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 November 1975, pages 1-2.

** The Chetverikov article is discussed in the TRENDS of 21 August 1974, pages 9-10.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW IGNORES KISSINGER'S REMARKS ON SALT PROBLEMS

Soviet media predictably have glossed over indications of problems in the SALT negotiations in reporting recent remarks by President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. As of this writing, Moscow has not carried any report on the Secretary's 10 November press conference, in which he criticized the Soviet rejection, without any counterproposal, of a recent compromise U.S. arms limitation proposal. And while a TASS report published in the 11 November PRAVDA did acknowledge the President's remark the day before on "Meet the Press" about some "very complex" problems at SALT, it ignored his expression of doubt on the chances for an agreement this year and his assertion that he felt no pressure to reach an agreement by any specific date.

Soviet media have routinely ignored potentially troublesome remarks on SALT and strategic affairs in reporting on statements made by U.S. officials. For instance, Moscow has never reported or commented publicly on President Ford's remark in a speech last August in Minneapolis that restraints on U.S. defense spending were dependent on progress in SALT, or his reference in the same speech to the benefits of U.S. "qualitative superiority."

PRAVDA readers were already apprised of the possibility that a SALT TWO agreement would not be reached until next year, in a 14 October TASS report of an earlier observation by the Secretary of State that prospects for an agreement were good, but that "whether this will occur in 1975 or at the beginning of 1976 will become clearer later."

There has been no Soviet comment on this most recent setback to the SALT timetable. A 10 November TASS report of a CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR editorial did reproduce the paper's warning against "any intention to delay the attainment of Soviet-American agreements under the pretext of political difficulties in an election year," since this could lead to a delay in the talks of at least two years and a "new round in the arms race." That report, however, was not carried by the central press on the 11th. In his 6 November speech marking the October Revolution anniversary, CPSU Politburo member Arvid Pelshe said that for its part the USSR "will continue to strive for further progress" in the SALT negotiations.

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OCTOBER REVOLUTION ANNIVERSARY

PELSHE KREMLIN SPEECH MARKS ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

Politburo member Arvid Pelshe provided an unexceptional assessment of the world situation in his 6 November speech at the Kremlin meeting marking the 58th anniversary of the October Revolution. Touching only briefly on a range of international topics, Pelshe cited in particular the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, said Moscow will strive for further progress in SALT and MBFR, and gave credit to the "realism" of Western leaders.

Coming in the wake of speculation about changes in Soviet policy toward non-ruling communist parties in Europe and elsewhere, Pelshe's remarks on international communism were distinctly conventional. He affirmed that Moscow believes its "international duty to the working class" is still best served "first and foremost by building communism in our own country with all our energy" and by "resolutely upholding the cause of peace throughout the world." Pelshe contended that "the sharpening of class contradictions in the capitalist world is accompanied by a growth in the danger from the right." The specter of fascism in the West has traditionally been cited by those arguing for a broad, united front alliance of communist parties with other left parties and against more militant tactics.

Pelshe gave a routine endorsement of the projected all-European communist party conference, preparations for which are scheduled to be completed this month at an editorial commission meeting in East Berlin. He refrained from any assessment of the current state of conference preparations or prediction as to when the conference would take place. Perhaps advisedly--in view of the delicate state of negotiations with the independently oriented parties over the substance of the conference document--Pelshe's endorsement did not evoke a chorus of support for a European conference at anniversary celebrations in the capitals of Moscow's East European allies. Only Czechoslovak Premier Strougal, in his 6 November speech, mentioned the conference, pledging his party's maximum efforts to insure the conference's success.

Pelshe perfunctorily repeated the dual themes of recent Soviet official statements regarding China: that Moscow remains ready to normalize relations but "will resolutely rebuff any encroachments on the interests of our homeland."

PRC ON ANNIVERSARY Peking's greetings message on the October Revolution anniversary--sent as usual from the NPC Standing Committee and the PRC State Council to their Soviet counterparts--repeated standard formulations to affirm China's

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interest in normalizing state relations despite ideological differences and to pledge solidarity with the Soviet "people." As in the past few years, the message was not carried by NCNA, but only by Radio Peking in Russian and English.

Like the Chinese greetings of the past two years, the message referred to the Sino-Soviet border problem. Last year's message had claimed that a "mutual understanding" had been achieved at the 1969 Chou-Kosygin meeting, and the message this year reiterated that frontier questions "must be solved in strict adherence with achieved mutual understanding." The current message added a new formulation that border questions must be solved by "taking practical steps through equal talks."

Like last year, Chinese officials attending the usual Soviet embassy reception on 6 November were led by Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan, who heads the Chinese delegation to the Sino-Soviet border talks. Last year the deputy head of the Soviet delegation to the talks, V.G. Gankovskiy, attended the ambassador's reception, but the NCNA report this year failed to note his presence. Like last year, Soviet talks delegation head Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev was absent from Peking.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW DISPARAGES RESULTS OF SADAT VISIT TO U.S.

As Egyptian President as-Sadat concluded his 26 October-5 November official visit to the United States, Soviet media continued in sparse comment to minimize the significance of the trip.* Most of the comment sought to depict as-Sadat as pursuing unrealistic goals in U.S.-Egyptian relations, both in terms of obtaining U.S. aid and influencing U.S. positions on Arab-Israeli issues. Moscow's Arabic-language broadcasts virtually ignored the visit, and comment has been confined almost exclusively to Soviet domestic media.

U.S. AID Asserting that as-Sadat had come to the United States primarily to obtain pledges of economic and military aid, Soviet comment sought to belittle the concrete results of his talks with U.S. leaders. A 6 November TASS review of the visit, for example, recalled that the Egyptian delegation shortly after arriving "spoke openly about its hopes for getting American arms" and that as-Sadat in a press conference had referred to his 1974 decision "to vary sources of arms supplies." To suggest U.S. hesitancy on the issue, TASS cited a White House spokesman's statement that no concrete decisions on military aid had been made during as-Sadat's visit. TASS also cited speculation in the New York TIMES that such decisions would be postponed until the 1976 presidential elections due to, TASS explained, the "influential Zionist lobby" in Congress.

Some comment suggested that in the course of the visit a vast gap had become evident between Egypt's inflated expectations of aid and actual U.S. intentions. PRAVDA's editor for Asian and African countries, Pavel Demchenko, noted on Moscow radio's 2 November roundtable that an agreement had been signed for Washington to deliver grain, flour, and tobacco worth under 100 million dollars-- "not a large quantity"--but that the topic of industrial construction, "which Egypt acutely needs," was apparently not discussed. Demchenko emphasized that Egypt's hopes for abundant U.S. aid--which he described as "naive ideas envisioned by bourgeois Cairo journalists"--were not fulfilled during as-Sadat's visit and had now "evaporated like a desert mirage."

* Moscow's initial reaction to as-Sadat's visit, which included a PRAVDA Observer article on relations with Egypt on the day as-Sadat departed Cairo, is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 October, pages 1-5.

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During as-Sadat's visit, Moscow did not report U.S. statements that Egypt's interest in U.S. arms would receive further study. A 2 November PRAVDA International review by Ye. Grigoryev was typical in noting merely that "Washington is not showing any haste" on agreeing to military aid for Egypt. TASS on 11 November, however, reported Secretary Kissinger's remarks during a press conference the previous day that Egypt's requests for military aid had been discussed "only in general" during as-Sadat's visit and that no concrete list of requests had yet been submitted by Egypt, further quoting Kissinger as saying that when specific requests are made, "we shall decide accordingly" but that the final decision will be Congress's.

In underlining Egypt's allegedly unrealistic views on U.S. aid, Soviet comment seized on signs of continued strong U.S. support for Israel, often contrasting this assistance with that offered to Egypt. Comment noted, for example, that the U.S. foreign aid bill submitted to Congress by President Ford on 30 October requests \$750 million in economic aid for Egypt, but nothing for military assistance. In contrast, it was noted that the bill requests \$2.24 billion dollars in military credits and economic aid for Israel. TASS on the 6th interpreted this, as had PRAVDA on 1 November, as a vindication of earlier "warnings of realistically minded Arab statesmen" that "the imperialist protectors of Israel" would not provide meaningful military aid to Arab countries. And although TASS on the 6th reported without comment the agreement in principle on the purchase by Egypt of two nuclear-power reactors, TASS earlier on the 3d had sought to undercut the significance of the prospective agreement by reporting that the United States was examining the question of supplying both Egypt and Israel with such reactors.

EGYPT'S "OPEN-DOOR" POLICY

In line with past Soviet criticism of Egypt's economic "open-door" policy, Moscow noted with muted but obvious displeasure as-Sadat's invitations for U.S. investments in Egypt's economy.* TASS on 30 October and Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic on 1 November reported as-Sadat's address to the Economic Club in New York, noting that he had urged U.S. businessmen to invest capital in Egypt and had reminded his audience that special legislation was passed last year in Egypt to protect and encourage foreign investments. The Arabic broadcast commented that Egypt's policy meant "abandonment of the socialist direction and replacement of it with a capitalist

* For a discussion of Moscow's reaction to Egypt's "capitalist tendencies," see the TRENDS of 9 January 1974, page 3.

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policy" and warned that Egypt stood to lose its "political and economic independence" and "all the social gains secured by a socialist policy." In another disingenuous criticism of Egypt, a Moscow radio Arabic commentary on the 6th pointedly left Egypt off a list of Arab countries "now proceeding on the road to socialism" and noted with approval Arab criticism of "those responsible Arab leaders who do not appreciate the role and importance of the friendship and cooperation of the Arab and socialist countries."

ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES Soviet comment on as-Sadat's appeals to U.S. audiences for assurances of Palestinian rights has been meager, but it has generally portrayed his efforts to influence U.S. thinking on this issue as unrealistic and unproductive. Attempting to exploit the absence of a final communique, for example, the 6 November TASS review of the visit asserted that the lack of a communique indicated U.S.-Egyptian disagreement "on a number of major questions, including the Palestinian problem." TASS also cited remarks by PLO spokesman and head of its "political department," Faruq Qadummi, that as-Sadat's visit had not advanced the Palestinian cause and that "U.S. policy remains hostile toward the Palestinian people."

Not surprisingly, as-Sadat's defenses of the Sinai II accord in his UN address and elsewhere were left unreported by Soviet media.

SOVIET NOTE URGES GENEVA TALKS, INITIAL PLO PRESENCE

Moscow's longstanding call for resumption of the Geneva Mideast conference has been reaffirmed in a Soviet Government note to the U.S. Government proposing that the two countries, as co-chairmen, reconvene the conference. The proposal is most notable for its advocacy of PLO participation "from the very beginning" of the conference--a stand not taken since July 1974.

Moscow's proposal for PLO participation "from the very beginning" comes against the background of recently reaffirmed U.S. concurrence in Israel's longstanding refusal to negotiate with the PLO as long as it refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist. The last previous Soviet media reference to PLO attendance at the start of a Geneva conference was a Yu. Kornilov TASS commentary on 4 July 1974 pegged to the just-concluded third U.S.-USSR summit. Subsequently, Moscow continued as before to advocate Palestinian representation and/or PLO participation at Geneva; but virtually all Soviet comment skirted the issue of the timing for a Palestinian presence at the conference. Rare comment on the issue suggested a certain Soviet flexibility, saying that the issue could be decided once the conference was reconvened.

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The Soviet initiative may have been intended to prevent Moscow from lagging too far behind Egypt and others in projecting a public posture of support for Palestinian interests. As it was, the Soviet note followed by some 10 days President as-Sadat's UNGA proposals on virtually the same issues. Soviet media had ignored what as-Sadat termed an "official request" in his 29 October UNGA address that the United States and the USSR begin discussions "with all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization," on resumption of the Geneva conference "in the immediate future." As-Sadat had also urged the General Assembly to adopt a resolution that the PLO "be represented in the work of the Geneva peace conference on equal footing with the other parties taking part in this conference," noting that Egypt would soon (4 November) officially propose such a resolution in the UN.

The note's release seemed timed to cap a week of UNGA debate on the Palestinian issue and to precede UNGA voting on two resolutions on that issue. As reported by TASS on the 10th, one of the two adopted UNGA resolutions "urges the necessity of the Palestinian people's participation in any effort aimed at attaining a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."

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D P R K - U S S R

PYONGYANG, MOSCOW CONTINUE TO INDICATE STRAINED RELATIONS

The chill in DPRK-Soviet relations that has been evident for more than a year was strikingly illustrated again in Pyongyang's treatment of the 58th anniversary of the Soviet October Revolution on 7 November.

Already in 1974 North Korea had played down the occasion by sending alternate rather than full members of the KWP Political Committee to the anniversary functions in Pyongyang. This year there was a further downgrading of the Korean representation at the 6 November Pyongyang meeting and the Soviet ambassador's banquet, with only one alternate member of the Political Committee, Vice Premier Chong Chun-ki, attending while the year before there had been three alternate members. Moreover, the Koreans showed other signs of reduced cordiality at both functions--Korean speakers omitted a routine formulation of past years that had described Korean happiness over Soviet successes. Also this year, the Koreans omitted the previously customary salutation "dear comrades" from their anniversary greetings message sent by Kim Il-song and Premier Kim Il to the Soviet leaders, both in the Pyongyang radio and KCNA English versions as well as that printed in PRAVDA. The KWP newspaper NODONG SINMUN, in line with this year's cooler treatment of the anniversary, marked the occasion only with an article, rather than the more authoritative editorial article employed during the past two years.

Strains in Soviet-DPRK relations also were suggested in a 30 October Soviet-Vietnamese declaration, signed during the Moscow visit by VWP First Secretary Le Duan, which failed even to mention the DPRK in its paragraph on the Korean issue. It seems likely that this omission was at Soviet insistence, since communiques which Le Duan had signed earlier in Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia before arriving in the USSR all had specifically offered the DPRK support in its efforts to achieve a solution of the Korean problem.

At a lower level, Soviet relations with North Korea have remained correct, as evidenced by Moscow's treatment of the 10 November 30th anniversary of the Korean-Soviet Friendship Society. PRAVDA on the 11th reported a Brezhnev message and the award of a People's Friendship Order to the society by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

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The Romanian-Soviet Friendship Society was among several East European friendship groups which have received similar greetings on their decennial anniversaries during the past year, indicating that such treatment at this level is not necessarily a sign of good official relations.

The Brezhnev message stressed the friendship of the two "peoples," pledging that the "Soviet people" always side with the "Korean people" in their efforts to "terminate imperialist interference" in domestic affairs and to achieve unification by peaceful means. Brezhnev also stated that "fraternal relations" between the CPSU and KWP and the USSR and DPRK "facilitate the successful advancement of our countries along the path of socialism and communism." In addition, he praised the "great success" in socialist construction achieved by the DPRK under the KWP's leadership.

Pyongyang marked the 30th anniversary of the friendship society with a 10 November "friendship gathering" attended by two of the vice chairmen of the society and by the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang.

YUGOSLAVIA

BELGRADE LINKS COMINFORMIST ACTIVITY TO RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW

For the first time in Yugoslavia's month-long campaign against pro-Soviet and other dissidents, Belgrade has directly linked the subject of Cominformist activity to the question of current Soviet-Yugoslav relations. In a report delivered at an 11 November LCY Executive Committee discussion of ideological activities, Executive Committee secretary Todo Kurtovic linked the Cominformists to the overall question of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation by suggesting that their activities violated the principles of the 1955 and 1956 Belgrade and Moscow declarations, which provide the very basis for this cooperation. However, in his carefully worded remarks, Kurtovic stopped short of alleging direct Soviet support for the Cominformists, rather seeming to leave an inference that it was the Cominformists themselves who were distorting or misusing the Belgrade and Moscow declarations. In eschewing direct accusations against Moscow, Kurtovic was being consistent with other Belgrade efforts to prevent the current crackdown against pro-Soviet groups from damaging relations with Moscow.

The definitive Belgrade view of Soviet-Yugoslav relations has been that Moscow, in signing the two declarations, had acknowledged the principle of different roads to socialism and, in effect, pledged not to interfere in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. Accordingly, Kurtovic disputed the interpretations by "certain circles" that the declarations have somehow been superseded by the development of Soviet-Yugoslav bilateral cooperation and emphasized that they were "topical even today, among other things precisely because of such interpretations."

Kurtovic underscored Yugoslavia's independent socialist development in that part of his speech dealing with ideological tasks in which he maintained that the party must stress the "differences between our experiences and those of the other communist parties," which he described as "big." Consistent with other comment, however, he asserted that, despite these differences, "we can and wish to keep on cooperating" with the other parties. Tito's October Revolution anniversary message to the Soviet leaders, reported by TANJUG on the 5th, provided another indication of Belgrade's concern to maintain good relations with Moscow in voicing his conviction that "friendly relations and fruitful cooperation" between the governments and parties would continue. Belgrade also appeared to ascribe a special priority to Soviet relations in recently assigning a member of the party Presidium, Joze Smole, to the ambassadorship in Moscow.

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Significantly, Belgrade's willingness to link the Cominformist activity to the question of current relations with Moscow came only three days after Stane Dolanc reviewed bilateral relations with Soviet Politburo member Kirilenko and Central Committee Secretary Katushev during a stopover in Moscow following a tour of Mongolia, North Korea and Japan. Assessing his Moscow talks on his return to Belgrade on the 9th, Dolanc pointed out that both sides had expressed "readiness and interest" in promoting cooperation, but he appeared to suggest a degree of friction in adding that they also discussed "all things that should be done" so that cooperation could continue and that they stressed "mutual responsibility" for the status quo and the future development of relations.

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CHINA

PEKING BLAMES LIMITED 1975 GRAIN HARVEST ON BAD WEATHER

A 9 November NCNA preliminary report on China's total grain output for 1975 implies there was only a modest gain over the record 1974 harvest of 255-260 million tons of grain. NCNA gave no statistics for the grain harvest this year, claiming only that it was "estimated" to be "greater than" that of 1974. The likelihood that this year's total grain production figure probably fell short of expectations was indicated by the report's omission of any claim for grain production in a number of traditionally high-yield provinces, including Szechwan, Kwangtung, and several east China provinces. NCNA credited only eight provinces--Sinkiang, Shensi, Tsinghai, Kansu, Shansi, Shantung, Kiangsi and Yunnan--with increases of 10 percent above last year's harvest, and most of these provinces are not major grain producers.

Revealing that poor weather has played a major role in limiting the size of this year's grain harvest, NCNA stated that "the worst summer drought in decades hit certain areas in the northeast, north and southwest China" and that "excessive rain caused flooding in parts of Honan and Hupeh in central China and in neighboring Anhwei Province in east China." The report urged all cadres to "beat off the effects of natural calamities" and to "win a good harvest."

NCNA noted a number of concrete measures taken to stabilize agricultural production during periods of natural disaster. It stated that use of chemical fertilizer was up by nearly 25 percent over last year and that production of several types of farm machinery was up 40 percent over 1974. In addition to scientific advances, the report cited a number of statistics on farm improvement, especially water conservation measures, which have contributed to China's agricultural gains this year in the face of poor natural conditions.

The measures cited as leading to improved production are the same ones stressed during the intensive drive now underway to learn from the model Tachai agricultural brigade. The Tachai campaign, spurred by the recent national agricultural conference,* has dominated provincial media in recent weeks and has been the subject of mass

* For a discussion of this conference, see the TRENDS of 17 September 1975, pages 23-24, of 1 October 1975, pages 30-32, of 16 October, page 29, and of 22 October 1975, pages 24-25.

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rallies throughout the country. The campaign's stress on the use of non-ideological, economic measures to increase production may stem from the fact that gains this year fell below expectations. A 2 to 3 percent increase in grain output--at least 5 million tons--is needed each year just to keep pace with China's estimated annual population growth.

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PRC-BANGLADESH: China's initial reaction to the successive military coups in Bangladesh earlier this month came in a 9 November NCNA dispatch which avoided comment in Peking's own name but replayed favorable foreign media reports on the most recent coup carried out under the leadership of Army Chief of Staff Ziaur Rahman. NCNA's dispatch described this 7 November coup as receiving "enthusiastic welcome" from the people and causing "considerable anxiety" in India. NCNA noted that Ziaur Rahman had been arrested earlier on 3 November in a coup led by Khaild Musharaf, and it implied Moscow and New Delhi support for that coup by noting their "speedy" reports of it. NCNA then reported Ziaur Rahman's successful "counter-coup d'etat" on 7 November, stating that this coup had "the support of the armed forces and the people." NCNA noted reports from Dacca which claimed that "hundreds of thousands" of capital residents "swarmed into the streets" to welcome the new Ziaur Rahman government.

HEMISPHERIC ARMY CONFERENCE: Moscow has characterized as a failure the 11th conference of U.S. and Latin American armies in Montevideo, Uruguay, from 20-25 October, seeing it as an unsuccessful U.S. attempt to use the "Red threat" to "bind Latin American armed forces more firmly to the Pentagon chariot." Discussing the conference's reported failure to agree to a proposal for creating a hemispheric peace force, IZVESTIYA correspondent R. Tuchnin on 1 November described the decision as a setback for "Latin American 'gorillas'" who were "supported by the Pentagon's emissaries." V. Berezin and V. Vinogradov, in a 26 October RED STAR article, said the proposed inter-American force would have been a "punitive organ to suppress their own peoples' anti-imperialist struggle" and a "threat to the Latin American states' independence and sovereignty," as evidenced by the Pentagon's broadening ties with the Chilean junta. In another RED STAR article on the 30th, V. Chusanov hailed the Latins' rejection of alleged Pentagon efforts to "intimidate all with the bogey of the so-called 'Red threat.'" Chusanov noted that Latin Americans were "increasingly directing their dissatisfaction toward their real enemy and toward the reactionary foundations which U.S. imperialism is trying so hard to maintain on the continent."

CUBA BACKS BELIZE: The Castro regime's traditional support for the independence of Belize has been reinforced by an 8 November commentary with harsh anti-Guatemalan and anti-U.S. condemnations broadcast over Havana's major "Our America" program for Latin American listeners. The commentator deplored "the intensification of military preparations" by Guatemala against Belize, a British colony in Central America whose approaching independence has been threatened by Guatemalan warnings--should Britain proclaim an independence date--which have cited ancient

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claims upon Belize territory. The Cuban commentator warned that Guatemala had "provoked a crisis" through its "threatening stand" and also charged that "the U.S. imperialist government" was giving "behind the scenes support" to Guatemala, citing as evidence the fact that the U.S. ambassador to Mexico had said the United States would not halt a Guatemalan invasion of the disputed land. Turning to another favorite villain, the commentator accused "U.S. oil trusts" of unspecified "maneuvers" in an attempt to gain control of petroleum deposits in the Belize jungles. Havana's verbal support to Belize reflects the Castro regime's known dislike of the authoritarian Guatemalan government and, more importantly, is consistent with Cuba's recent foreign policy emphasis on cultivating ties with the English-speaking Caribbean countries.

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C O R R E C T I O N

A note entitled "Peking on USSR-Angola" in the 5 November TRENDS, pages 31-32, erroneously stated that a 2 November Peking Arabic broadcast reported that the Chinese Government had issued a statement on Angola on 31 October. A recheck of this broadcast revealed that the reference was to a Kenyan Government statement. Thus, the last two sentences of this note should be deleted.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 3 - 9 NOVEMBER 1975

Moscow (2143 items)

October Revolution Anniversary	(--)	33%
[Brezhnev Speech]	(--)	5%]
[Pelshe Speech]	(--)	4%]
China	(6%)	6%
Podgorny Meeting with New Lao Ambassador	(--)	3%

Peking (921 items)

Angola	(1%)	8%
USSR	(3%)	7%
[U.S.-Soviet Grain Agreement]	(--)	3%]
PRC-Fiji Diplomatic Relations	(--)	6%
UNGA 30th Session	(11%)	5%
PRC Foreign Ministry Statement on Indian Border Clash	(--)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.